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Political economists have long debated the relationship between 
decentralization and conflict.  There has been little discussion, however, about two 
key aspects of decentralization: first, to which levels of local government power 
should be decentralized, and second, on what basis new decentralized districts should 
be created.  In order to understand the relationship between these two aspects of 
decentralization and conflict I investigate here the case of Uganda, where President 
Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) government 
embarked on a radical decentralization programme upon coming into power in 1986.  
I argue here that Uganda’s decentralization programme, while helping to reduce 
national-level conflict, has nonetheless replaced it with local-level conflict.  This 
process has taken place in two ways.  First, the concentration of local power at the 
district level has led to struggles over district leadership positions.  Second, the huge 
expansion in the number of new districts has led to local-level conflict by altering 
relations between local ethnic groups. 
 
                                                 
1 Paper prepared for presentation at the CRISE Conference on Decentralization, Federalism and 
Conflict, Department of International Development, University of Oxford.  I thank Donald Horowitz, 
John McGarry, Raufu Mustapha, conference participants and an anonymous referee for suggestions; all 




Despite a burgeoning literature on decentralization and conflict, there has been 
no consensus among political economists about the relationship between these two 
phenomena.  Bardhan (2005: 105), for instance, has suggested that decentralization 
may be a way to ‘diffuse social and political tensions and ensure local cultural and 
political autonomy.’  However, Brancati (2006) argues that, while decentralization 
may increase political participation, it may also encourage a growth in regional and 
ethnic political parties, and thereby lead to more conflict rather than less.  Treisman 
(2007) differs again, arguing that generalizing about the relationship between 
decentralization and conflict is impossible. 
This debate has largely been conducted about how and what functions of 
government should be decentralized to the local level in order to alleviate conflict.  
There has been little discussion, however, about two key aspects of decentralization: 
first, to which levels of local government power should be decentralized, and second, 
on what basis new decentralized political units should be created.  In the first instance 
this topic is especially important to countries like Uganda which have a large number 
of layers of local government similar in structure.  Unlike countries like the U.S., 
India or Nigeria with federal systems, where states are vastly different in design from 
village-level local governments, Uganda’s decentralization program has been well 
designed to diffuse power across different levels of local government.  Yet there has 
been precious little analysis of the nature of decentralization on local-level conflict 
across these levels.  In the second case, countries like Nigeria and Uganda have seen 
an explosion in the number of federal states and districts, respectively, as a means to 
build up patrimonial support among local elites without any concomitant research into 
what effect this process has had on local- and national-level conflict. 
Thus I investigate here the case of Uganda, where President Yoweri Museveni 
and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) government embarked on a radical 
decentralization programme upon coming into power in 1986.  Uganda’s 
decentralization program has drawn large amounts of praise from donors and scholars 
alike; Francis and James (2003: 325), for instance, have called it ‘one of the most far-
reaching local government reform programs in the developing world.’  Yet I argue 
here that Uganda’s decentralization programme, while helping to reduce national-
level conflict, has nonetheless replaced it with local-level conflict.  This process has 
taken place in two ways.  First, the concentration of local power at the district level 
rather than its diffusion across all five levels of local government has led to struggles 
over district leadership positions.  Second, the huge expansion in the number of new 
districts has led to local-level conflicts in both the fight to create new districts and the 
way district creation has empowered local extremists. 
This paper is structured as follows.  First, I give an overview of 
decentralization in Uganda.  Second, I examine the role of both the concentration of 
power at the district level as well as the increasing number of districts in Uganda as 
causal factors in conflict.  Third and finally, I conclude with some wider thoughts on 
decentralization and conflict in countries like Uganda. 
 
2. An Overview of Decentralization in Uganda, 1986-present 
 
2.1. The Evolution of Decentralization in Uganda, 1986-present 
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Prior to 1986 Uganda’s local government system was very much controlled 
from Kampala, a legacy of Milton Obote’s rule from the 1960s.  After his 1966 coup 
Obote centralized control over land at the national Uganda Land Commission and 
granted the central government the right to appoint all major local government jobs 
and dissolve local councils when it saw fit.  Idi Amin’s rule in the 1970s was no 
better: he benevolently allowed local elections for the first time in a decade in March 
1973, only to appoint to local positions 728 soldiers – who were naturally only 
accountable to Amin and the Ugandan military leadership – two months later 
(Jørgensen 1981: 308).  With no change under Obote’s second period in power in the 
early 1980s, clearly both presidents only saw local government as merely an extended 
arm of the central government. 
However, since coming to power in 1986, the NRM has invested much effort 
into completely transforming Uganda’s local government system.  It is difficult to 
overstate how much emphasis the NRM put on the success of its local government 
program upon taking power.  Indeed, within months of assuming office Museveni 
appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the Local Government System: according to 
its chairman, Mahmood Mamdani (1997), the Commission ‘considered the RC system 
as the kernel of the agrarian revolution brought to rural Uganda by the NRM.’  The 
NRM totally altered the formerly top-down local government system by instituting 
local democratic control through an increased number of popularly elected posts 
while also making all citizens mandatory members of their local Resistance Councils 
(RCs). 
 The RC system was first implemented in a trial form as early as 1981, when 
the NRM and its armed faction the National Resistance Army (NRA) began to 
organize ‘clandestine committees’ purely as a means for civilians to provide food and 
security for the NRA as it conducted a rebel war against President Obote’s second 
government.  After securing enough territory the NRA named these committees 
Resistance Councils (RCs) and allowed them to take on the responsibility of 
governing villages as well.  They did not collect taxes but rather judged local disputes, 
maintained regulations and roads and organized food supplies; RCs even had some 
remit to try and convict NRA soldiers involved in local crimes (Kasfir 2005: 287-
288). 
As the NRM regime became established in 1986 it spread the RC system 
throughout Uganda.  Due to their democratic nature RCs were ‘greeted with 
enthusiasm,’ winning the ‘confidence of members of the public… in most areas of the 
country’ (Golooba-Mutebi 1999: 105, 109).  At first the roles and responsibilities of 
the RCs were unclear, with many RC members initially thinking that their sole 
purpose was to distribute essential products like sugar.  However, the system became 
institutionalized with the 1987 Resistance Councils and Committees Statute, which 
set up a five-tier structure of local governance.  The RCs were numbered one through 
five, with RCI representing the village, RCII the parish, RCIII the sub-county, RCIV 
the county and RCV the district.  Each level had an executive committee with a chair, 
vice-chair and seven other positions.  All Ugandans residents were by definition 
members of their local RCIs, whose elected nine representatives then comprised the 
members of the RCIIs, who elected among themselves representatives to send to the 
RCIIIs and so on up through to the RCVs.  Elections for posts would take place every 
two years, beginning with the elections of 1987 and 1989, and RCI meetings took 
place on average once a month.  The districts were administered through the executive 
councils of the RCVs, the District Administrators, appointed by President Museveni, 
and the District Executive Secretary, appointed by the Minister of Local Government. 
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The NRM continued to reform and adjust the local government system.  In 
1992 Museveni launched the Local Government Decentralisation Programme, which 
initiated financial decentralization in thirteen districts in 1993 and another thirteen the 
next year, leading to the devolution of ‘decision-making functions on all matters of 
local significance’ to the District Revolutionary Councils (DRCs).  While the centre 
retained responsibility for ‘security matters, national planning, defence, immigration, 
foreign affairs and national projects…, all other activities become the responsibility of 
the DRCs’ (NV 6/4/1993). 
In order to monitor this financial decentralization, the NRC passed the Local 
Governments (Resistance Council) Act of 1993, which transferred power from central 
government representatives to the elected members of the RCV.  Specifically the Act 
replaced the District Administrator’s position as chairman of the local District 
Development Committee – whose job was to coordinate development activities in the 
district – with the RCV chairman, while making the District Executive Secretary 
responsible to the RCV rather than the Ministry of Local Government.  The Act also 
created the Local Government Finance Commission (LGFC), designed to consider 
and recommend local government grants to the President, who appoints the LGFC’s 
seven members every four years.  There are three types of local government grants, 
whose titles indicate their functions: unconditional, conditional and equalization. 
Further reforms to the RC system appeared in the 1995 constitution and 
subsequent acts of Parliament.  The Constitution – the country’s first since 1967 – 
renamed the RCs as Local Councils (LCs) while also mandating direct popular 
elections at all levels of local government.  The Local Government Act of 1997 
increased the powers of the local governments while formalizing the distribution of 
district revenue to be allocated to the various LC levels.  For instance, it gave power 
over the hiring and firing of all local civil servants – some of whom were previously 
appointed by the central government’s Public Service Commission – to the District 
Service Commission, whose members are appointed by the District Council.  As 
regards fiscal matters, power over revenue collection was given to the sub-county, of 
which it would retain 42.25%, redistributing 35% to the district, 3.25% each to the 
county and parish, and 16.25% to the villages.  The Act also finalized the structure of 
equalization grants that are to be given to districts with poor revenue collection per 
capita; the government allocated 3.5bn Ush in equalization grants to 34 districts in 
2004/05, up from 2.5bn in 1999/2000 (Government of Uganda 2005).  Finally, the 
1998 Land Act decentralized control over land from the Uganda Land Commission in 
Kampala to the various District Land Boards and Parish Land Committees, with Land 
Tribunals at the LCV and LCIII level. 
 
2.2. Analysis of Uganda’s Decentralization Program 
 
As noted, Uganda’s decentralization reforms have drawn high praise from a 
variety of scholars such as Furley (2000: 93), who writes of the LCs as ‘an important 
step in increasing democracy’ in Uganda, or Mamdani (1996: 208), who praised the 
creation of the LC system as one of ‘enormous significance.’  Government rhetoric 
about the LC system has also been extremely positive and has often linked the system 
to an increase in national solidarity: the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Ibrahim 
Mukiibi claimed that one of the purposes of the LCs was to ‘promote the national 
awareness and patriotism in our country,’ while deputy Minister Jack Sabiiti claimed 
that they are a ‘source of unity’ and ‘fulfill the ideals and wishes of our ancestors’ 
(NRC Hansard, 24/6/1987: 114; 25/6/1987: 127). 
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Certainly the most basic positive result of Uganda’s decentralization program 
has been the way it has helped to prevent any repeat of the conflicts which wracked 
the country in the 1960s, when the Buganda kingdom government twice attempted to 
secede from the country.  Indeed, the insipient talks of secession from politicians in 
northern Uganda dissatisfied with Museveni’s conduct of the war with the Lord’s 
Resistance Army seem to be more tied with the potential secession of southern Sudan 
than any internal dynamics within Uganda (Mao 2006).  Similarly, the uniform way in 
which decentralization has been implemented across the whole country has helped to 
counter the accusations of regional bias that exist at the national level (Green 2006).  
With the sole exception of Kibaale district (as detailed below), President Museveni 
has not exercised his right to take over the functioning of district governments, even 
as local politicians like Gulu district chairman Norbert Mao explicitly oppose 
Museveni’s policies and mobilize local resources against the national government.2
Yet, as detailed below, the end effect of Uganda’s decentralization reforms has 
been to decentralize conflict to the local level.  In order to examine this phenomenon, 
I first examine the way decentralization has been concentrated at the district level 
before moving on to detail the effect of the creation of new districts on local-level 
conflict. 
 
3. Concentrated Decentralisation 
 
Uganda’s decentralization reforms were designed to give equal amounts of 
power to the various levels of the LC system, with particular emphasis on the LCIII.  
However, as Wunsch and Ottomoeller (2004: 207) note, ‘the district is 
overwhelmingly the most powerful actor among the five levels of local government.’  
This concentrated decentralization has led to increased levels of local conflict for two 
reasons.  First, the increased concentration of resources at the district level has led to 
struggles over the district leadership.  Second, the concentration of power at the 
district has led the NRM government to maintain representatives at the district level, 
thereby leading to clashes between national and local governments at the district 
level.  After sketching out how power has become concentrated at the district level, I 
examine each of these conflicts in turn. 
 
3.1. The Concentration of Power at the District Level 
 
Due to the failures of local revenue collection, the ability of districts to attract 
central government funds has led to a fiscal concentration at the LCV level.  
According to a LGFC study, 
 
[The] Revenue sources assigned to local governments… include among others 
graduated tax, market dues, property tax, parking fees and permits…  In this 
arrangement the central government has retained the high yielding taxes while 
the local governments were left with minor taxes with poor yield, difficult to 
assess, collect and administer (Government of Uganda 2002: 4). 
 
Indeed, LCI-LCIV governments are almost completely reliant upon local revenue, 
most of which until recently came from graduated personal tax (GPT).  The GPT was 
                                                 
2 In this regard Museveni should be positively contrasted with the various Prime Ministers of India who 
have collectively used ‘President’s Rule’ to take over the functioning of a federal state over 100 times 
since 1947. 
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a very regressive tax, with an upper limit of 80,000 Ush and an ‘extremely arbitrary’ 
system of assessing household income.3  Its subsequent unpopularity first led to a 
‘reluctance to collect taxes’ on the part of local governments, which in turn led to a 
collection rate of only 60% of adults over 18 (Government of Uganda 2002: 4, 28).  
Thus local governments saw their total revenue collection decrease in nominal terms 
from 109bn Ush in 1997/98 to 51bn in 2002/03 (EA 9/8/2004).  As a result of the 
GPT’s low turnover and high unpopularity the NRM eventually decided to eliminate 
it in 2005 to avoid it being a political issue in the 2006 presidential and parliamentary 
elections. 
To compensate for decreasing local revenues, the central government has 
subsequently doubled the percentage of total public expenditure spent on local 
government, from 17% in 1994/95 to 35% in 2001/02 (Government of Uganda 2002: 
9; Saito 2003: 127).4  Yet these funds are always first dispersed to the district 
governments, leading to an inevitable accumulation of what money does exist at the 
district level.  Indeed, as MP Ezati Wadri (Terego, Arua) noted in 2001, ‘much as the 
center is decentralizing the resources and powers to the districts, the districts seem to 
be still clutching to power and the resources…  When will the districts also 
reciprocate and be able to decentralize resources, authority and power to the lower 
levels?’ (Parliament of Uganda Hansard, 3/10/2001). 
Furthermore, while the percentage of taxes collected by the sub-counties 
required by law to be given to the district did reach its source, the reverse was not 
true: ‘the revenues collected by the districts… [are] never shared with the sub-
counties.’  Thus, the LGFC notes, the cash-strapped sub-counties do not have enough 
funds to send the legally mandated percentage of their revenues to the other levels of 
local government: ‘in some cases villages (LCI) and parishes (LCII) have received 
funds once in three years…  The situation is made worse by the fact that higher local 
governments (districts and municipalities) do not share provide [sic] financial 
information to lower local governments’ (Government of Uganda 2002: 24-25, 33-
34). 
All the above is compounded by the fact that donors, in their attempt to fund 
Uganda’s decentralization program, often bypass the central government in order to 
give money directly to district governments – but not to any lower-level units.  
Indeed, donors have agreed to divide their concentration in Uganda according to 
district, with Austria focusing on Kisoro district, Belgium on Kasese district, 
Denmark on Rakai district, Ireland on Kibaale, Kiboga and Kumi districts, and the 
Netherlands on Arua, Katakwi, Lira, Moyo, Nebbi, Soroti and Yumbe districts.  The 
result of this focus on the district level is an even larger build-up of assets at the LCV 
level (Interview with Martin Kabuye, Kiboga, 15/11/2001). 
Various studies have confirmed this concentration of funds at the district level.  
For instance, a Ministry of Local Government survey of nine districts in 2002 noted 
that ‘there is hardly any officer in charge of education in all the sub-counties visited…  
This is because this function is entirely being performed by the district.’  The same 
applied to health services: ‘at the sub-county level, health services are almost entirely 
                                                 
3 A person with an income of 32,000 Ush paid a GPT rate of 9.4% while people with incomes of 
330,000 and 1.5m Ush only paid 5.7% and 5.3%, respectively (Livingstone and Charlton 1998: 504-
505). 
4 This increase has largely come in the form of the 26 available conditional grants under the Poverty 
Action Fund (PAF), 71% of which is transferred to local governments.  From 1998 to 2001 the PAF 
doubled as a percentage of the central government’s budget, jumping from 17% to 34% (Government 
of Uganda 2002: 63). 
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being performed by the higher local government.’  In his field work in three districts 
in 1999 and 2000, Saito (2003: 138) came to similar conclusions, arguing that 
‘disbursements of funds are often hindered by the upper levels of the LC system, 
particularly by districts for their administrative costs, and the full amount rarely 
reaches lower LCs for the intended local development activities.’  Similarly, Jones 
(2008) notes the way the Kumi district government in eastern Uganda has almost no 
presence at the sub-county or below except in the form of village courts. 
 
3.2. Conflicts over District Leadership 
 
The result of this concentration of resources at the district level is the 
increased importance of the position of LCV Chairman.  One need no better example 
of this phenomenon than the decision of Norbert Mao, an MP for Gulu Municipality 
since 1996, to resign from Parliament in 2006 and run instead for the position of Gulu 
District Chairman.  After winning the election he claimed that he was ‘tired of being a 
commentator in Kampala: in local government, you are in charge.  In fact I wish I had 
gone there earlier’ (Mao 2006). 
Yet the increased importance and power of the LCV chairman has also led to a 
concomitant rise in conflict over the position, and as a result elections for LCV Chair, 
held every five years, are very often fraught affairs, regularly drawing more ire and 
attention than elections for Parliament.  A prime example was the 2002 LCV election 
in Kibaale, a district in western Uganda.  A district which was traditionally populated 
by members of the Banyoro ethnic group, there had been two resettlement schemes in 
the 1970s and 1990s that brought over Bakiga from the highly-populated area of 
Kigezi in south-western Uganda.  The result of these schemes, however, was to 
increase the percentage of Bakiga in the district to over 50% to the point where 
Robert Kakooza, a Mukiga,5 was elected as MP for Buyaga county in 1996; Kakooza 
was, however, replaced by Ignatius Musisira, a Munyoro, in the subsequent 2001 
election. 
While the 1996 parliamentary election was a peaceful affair, the same cannot 
be said for the 2002 LCV election.  In preparation for the election, between the 
incumbent Munyoro Sebastian Ssekitolekko and the Mukiga Fred Ruremera, a local 
xenophobic Banyoro group launched a campaign of violence that included hate 
speech on local radio.  Violence inevitably broke out after the election, with several 
Bakiga murdered by Banyoro extremists and many more being threatened with 
expulsion from the district, leading to the deployment of anti-riot police.  President 
Museveni responded with his first-ever – and so far only – use of clause 202 of the 
1995 Constitution of Uganda, which allows him to take over the rule of a district in 
exceptional circumstances, thereby negating Ruremera’s election.  Indeed, rather than 
reprimand the local extremists who stoked up the violence, Museveni replaced 
Ruremera with George Namyaka, a native Munyoro, in order to calm the situation 
(Green 2007). 
Another example comes from neighbouring Kiboga district.  Local MP and 
Minister of State for Defence Ruth Nankabirwa intervened in the 2002 LCV election, 
accusing the incumbent Siraje Kizito of embezzling more than 200m Ush, and then 
later claimed that Kizito’s subsequent re-election was only due to the illegal 
importation of voters from outside Kiboga.  In a subsequent trial in Kampala, losing 
                                                 
5 Mukiga is the singular form for Bakiga; a similar rule applies to other Bantu ethnic groups like the 
Baganda, Banyankole and Banyoro. 
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LCV candidate Edward Katumba accused Kizito, a Muslim, of giving and promising 
piglets to voters in return for votes and accused the EC of failing to update the 
district’s voters register; as a result, the High Court declared the LCV seat vacant and 
called for another election in July 2002.  The matter was eventually resolved when the 
Court of Appeal upheld the election in a unanimous decision, claiming that the 
electoral irregularities were not large enough to affect the result. 
LCV elections are regularly challenged in court, especially on the charge that 
candidates do not hold any A-levels, the academic minimum for holding the district 
chairmanship.  As with parliamentary seat elections, which have also been challenged 
due to lack of academic qualifications, opposition candidates and supporters have 
used the courts to challenge candidates they were previously unable to defeat at the 
polls.  Most recently, the LCV Chairperson of Bududa district in eastern Uganda had 
his 2006 election nullified by the Ugandan High Court after failing to present official 
A-level papers, while in 2002 the Electoral Commission disqualified three LCV 
chairperson candidates in Kamuli, Mayuge and Mukono districts for lack of 
qualifications.  In Masaka district in southern Uganda the losing candidate in the 2002 
LCV elections, former MP Shannon Kakungulu, sued the winner, Vincent Ssempijja, 
for failing to hold the proper qualifications.  After intervention in the case from 
President Museveni, NRM Vice-Chairman Moses Kigongo and Minister of Local 
Government Jabieri Bidandi-Ssali, Kakungulu dropped the suit, only to have the 
charge against Ssempijja resurface in the 2006 elections.  In Kiboga district, in 1998 
the High Court ruled that the winner of the LCV Chairmanship election did not have 
the proper academic qualifications to run for the post, forcing a new election.  The by-
elections held for the post in January 1999, were nullified by the Electoral 
Commission (EC) for various electoral malpractices, including the arrest of seven 
electoral officers, one of whom was accused of voting more than one hundred times.  
In the end the aforementioned Siraje Kizito won the election after only around ¼ of 
the electorate voted: the MP Nathias Sewankambo (Kiboga East) blamed the low 
turnout on people’s fear of being arrested by the hundreds of EC officials and 
volunteers supervising the election. 
 
3.3. National-Local Conflict 
 
The second reason why power has been concentrated at the district level is 
because of the NRM’s interest in maintaining power over local politics.  This is not 
atypical of the experience of decentralization in other African countries like Kenya, 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe, whose governing parties have simultaneously pursued 
decentralization while also seeking to extend their political power into the countryside 
in order to win elections (Crook 2003).  Indeed, Uganda’s existence as a ‘no-party’ 
state until 2005 meant that the NRM was able to extend itself into countryside through 
official state control.  Perhaps the most obvious example of this phenomenon was the 
passing of the Movement Act in 1997, which established an NRM committee at each 
level of local government whose members are elected by the next-lowest level.6  In 
doing so it also made all LC council members from the village to the district 
automatically members of the NRM, leading to be seen by many Ugandans as ‘a ploy 
by the Movement to turn the five-tiered [LC] system into branches of the movement’ 
                                                 
6 In other words, it uses the same indirect voting system by which the RC committees above the village 
level were elected prior to the 1995 constitution. 
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(Tripp 2004: 17).  Despite a transition to a multi-party system in 2005, the Movement 
Act still remained on the books for the 2006 LC elections.7
However, these local NRM committees are largely non-functional except 
during election time.  On a day-to-day basis the central government only has 
representatives at the district level, specifically in the two posts of the Chief 
Administrative Officer (formerly District Executive Secretary) and the Resident 
District Commissioner (formerly District Administrator).  Inevitably the attempts of 
the central government to wield power through these two positions has led to conflict 
with the district governments, as detailed below. 
As chief technocrat in the district, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) is 
one of the most powerful positions in local government.  The Local Government Acts 
of 1993 and 1997 gave local District Service Commissions the power to appoint their 
CAOs, who were thenceforth responsible to the local LCV.  Yet these Acts did not 
prevent the Ministry of Local Government from intervening in the appointment and 
firing of CAOs due to its fiscal control over central government grants.  One such 
incident occurred in June 2003, when the Ministry cut off funding for seven districts 
until the LCVs had removed their CAOs, while in April 2004 the Ministry Permanent 
Secretary Vincent Ssekono told the Tororo LCV chairman that, if he did not sack the 
district CAO, Ssekono ‘would advise the ministry of Finance to suspend 
unconditional grants to the district’ (M 14/6/2003; M 25/4/2004). 
More recently, in the same Constitutional (Amendment) Bill that removed 
presidential term limits in 2005, the Ugandan government recentralized the role of the 
CAO.  Specifically, it withdrew powers of appointment from the District Service 
Commission and re-allocated them to the Public Service Commission in Kampala.  
While the government claimed that this change was necessary as a means to remove 
corrupt CAOs, ARD (2005: 40) has correctly noted that the idea that central 
government transfers to local governments are now controlled by central government 
appointees ‘cuts at the very heart of the decentralization reform.’ 
The second central government representative, the Resident District 
Commissioner (RDC), is appointed by and responsible to the President and co-
ordinates future planning through the District Development Committee as well as 
monitoring and overseeing local government programs more generally (Interview 
with Protaz Tigurihwayo, Masaka, 13/12/2001).8  Indeed, the strategy of the NRM in 
moving RDCs around the country like foreign diplomats, with only a couple of years 
at their post before assuming a new position, has prevented the RDCs from 
identifying with local concerns against those of the central government.  This was 
quite obvious in the case of Protaz Tigurihwayo, the RDC for Masaka when I visited 
in December 2001 and a Munyankole from Bushenyi district who had never before 
served as RDC.  Tigurihwayo’s main complaint about the local government system 
was that his hands were tied by both the LCV chairperson, whom he claimed had too 
much power, and by LCV technocrats, whom he claimed should be appointed by the 
central government rather than by the District Service Commission (Interview with 
Protaz Tigurihwayo, Masaka, 13/12/2001).  Tigurihwayo’s dislike for local 
government staff could explain why the Masaka LCV executive council voted 
unanimously in favour of his transfer on December 18, 2003; he was moved back out 
                                                 
7 More recently the Ugandan Constitutional Court ruled that the 2006 LC elections were illegal under 
the new multi-party system; as a result the Parliament passed a law in February 2008 allowing for a 
new set of local elections across the country. 
8 Tigurihwayo also noted that his job involved ‘making sure the President’s name is not damaged.’ 
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west to Ntungamo district in President Museveni’s 2003 RDC reshuffle five days 
later. 
As regards the RDC’s role in elections, the International Foundation for 
Election Systems noted that  
 
The RDCs play an important role in many districts, controlling the electoral 
colleges representing these special interest groups as well as administering the 
political mobilizers in each district and the party schools. The RDCs played a 
partisan role in [the 1996 presidential and parliamentary] elections… (quoted 
in Human Rights Watch 1999, Chapter 6). 
 
More recently, in the context of the 2004 debate about President Museveni’s potential 
third term, the RDCs were accused by MPs of serving as NRM apparatchiks: 
 
Geoffrey Ekanya (Tororo) and Miria Matembe (Mbarara) said resident district 
commissioners were barring politicians including anti-Movement MPs from 
holding meetings.  Matembe said RDCs had taken on the role of parroting 
instead of monitoring or overseeing developments by local governments on 
behalf of the Government.  “If you are not carrying mashansha (dry banana 
leaves, a symbol of third term for presidency) the RDC hates you,” she said 
(NV 14/8/2004). 
 
That RDCs are generally pro-Movement should not be too surprising, considering that 
Museveni has made it a policy to appoint political allies who had lost elections; for 
instance, in his 2007 reshuffle he appointed as RDCs former ministers Alfred Ogaba 
and Wanjusi Wasieba, losers in the 2006 Mbale Municipality and 2001 Aruu County 
MP elections, respectively.  Naturally, while RDCs have failed to draw criticism from 
the Ministry of Local Government for being too pro-Movement, the Ministry has not 
refrained from rebuking CAOs or RDCs for ‘engaging in politics and issuing political 
statements’ when they ‘criticize leaders in government,’ as in the case where the 
Sironko district CAO blamed President Museveni for a shortfall in local revenue (NV 
14/8/2004).  For these reasons the main opposition candidate in the 2001 and 2006 
presidential elections, Kizza Besigye, promised in 2006 to abolish the position of 
RDC if he were elected. 
 It is therefore hardly surprising that one parliamentarian complained in 
reference to the CAO that ‘decentralization means that powerful district leaders are 
assigned instead of being elected from within’ (Constituent Assembly Proceedings 
6/7/1994: 624), and that little has changed in the intervening years to invalidate this 
claim. 
 
4. District Creation 
 
Uganda has seen an explosion in the number of districts, going from 33 in 
1986 to 80 in 2007.  While this expansion has ostensibly been guided by the 1995 
constitution, whose Article 179 permits the government to create new districts ‘on the 
necessity for effective administration and the need to bring services closer to the 
people,’ it is more likely Museveni has employed district creation as a source of 
patronage that allows him to continue winning elections (Green 2008).  The creation 
of these new districts has, however, increasingly politicizing ethnicity in Uganda 
despite Museveni’s claims to the contrary.  It is thus not clear that, despite Treisman 
 11
(2007: 245)’s claim to the contrary, the creation of new local government units has 
stabilized politics in Uganda. 
In this section I first sketch a history of district creation in Uganda before 
examining the increased levels of local conflict over district creation since 1986. 
 
4.1. A History of District Creation in Uganda 
 
 Under British colonialism Uganda was divided into four provinces, namely 
northern, eastern, western and the kingdom of Buganda.  These provincial divisions 
were largely unimportant in the formation of political identities with the exception of 
the case of Buganda.  Rather, each province was further divided into sixteen districts, 
which were overseen by British District Commissioners.  Other than in Buganda these 
districts were created along ‘tribal’ lines, whereby each district was supposedly 
ethnically homogenous and was ruled through ‘traditional’ leadership.  These districts 
were thus important in the subsequent formation of ethnic identity, for instance in the 
case of the Acholi and the Karamojong in the north and the Iteso in the east (Apter 
1959).  However, the British conception of African tribes as eternal and unchanging 
meant that new districts were very rarely created, and then only for explicitly 
administrative purposes. 
Upon independence in 1962 Uganda’s provincial divisions were dropped with 
one exception, Buganda, which subsequently became a federal state.  However, 
clashes between the then President of Uganda, the Kabaka (King) of Buganda, and 
Prime Minister Milton Obote led to the latter ousting the former in a coup in 1966, 
leading to the abolishment of Buganda as a governmental unit in Obote’s 1967 
constitution.  Idi Amin, however, subsequently reintroduced ten provincial 
governments in 1974, this time under the rule of military Governors, while also 
almost doubling the number of districts to 37.  As Jørgensen (1981: 309) notes, the 
reintroduction of the provinicial level as well as new districts provided patronage 
posts for Amin’s more ambitious soldiers, thereby relieving pressure on national 
politics and giving the new governors free reign to wreak havoc on the countryside. 
After Amin was overthrown the Uganda National Liberation Front 
government of 1979-1980 reduced the number of districts to 33, where it remained for 
a decade.  Museveni’s aforementioned Commission of Inquiry into the Local 
Government system – whose members were largely composed of academics, 
including current Prime Minister Apolo Nsibambi – deliberated about the creation of 
new districts.  It was, by implication, very critical of the proliferation of districts 
under Amin, arguing that, ‘quite often, the response of governments to popular 
demands for a more responsive administration (e.g., better services) has been to create 
new and smaller units… There is no doubt that the multiplication of administrative 
units is a costly affair’ (Government of Uganda 1987: 117).  In principle, the 
Commission, noted, 
 
We were hesitant to recommend the creation of new and additional 
administrative units, bearing in mind that these would increase unproductive 
costs of administration, both in terms of creating an administrative 
infrastructure and payment of personnel…  Given our strong view that the 
exercise in creating new districts over the past decade and a half has been 
arbitrary, haphazard and hardly defensible, we would have recommended a 
review of the status of all existing districts with a view to de-grading those 
which do not meet minimum criteria… Should such a review be undertaken in 
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the present circumstances, it would undoubtedly result in a large number of 
the newly created districts losing their existing status (Government of Uganda 
1987: 121-123). 
 
After spending several months touring the country, the Commission 
accumulated eleven requests for the creation of new districts, of which it only 
recommended four.  Yet Museveni, while failing to pursue the review of existing 
districts as recommended by the Commission, nonetheless withheld the creation of 
any new districts, only relenting on the case of Kalangala (comprising the Ssese 
islands in Lake Victoria) in 1990.  The next year, however, Museveni undertook the 
other three recommendations of the Commission and added another, the 
aforementioned district of Kiboga.  As Table 1 demonstrates, Museveni continued to 
add districts in 1994, 1997 and 2000 before announcing the creation of 23 new 
districts in 2005, the largest ever increase in Uganda’s history.9  Thus Uganda now 
has 80 districts, more than twice as many as when Museveni took office and more 
than four times as many as when Amin took office in 1971. 
 
Table 1: District Creation in Uganda 
(Sources: Government of Uganda 1987, Ocwich 2005, US Census Bureau) 
 
Year Number of Districts Population per District 
1959 16 443,000 
1962 17 456,365 
1968 18 513,711 
1971 19 526,853 
1974 37 292,211 
1979 33 368,115 
1990 34 513,412 
1991 38 476,474 
1994 39 514,256 
1997 45 455,718 
2000 56 427,786 
2005 70 402,848 
2006 80 365,081 
 
Furthermore, as Table 2 indicates, Uganda has the highest number of sub-
national political units – here understood as the highest level of local government – of 
any country in Africa,10 as well as a population per district ratio among the lowest on 
the continent.  Compared to other Anglophone countries and its neighbors in the Great 
Lakes region, Uganda has a lower population per highest-level unit ratio than any 
other country except Namibia and Botswana, which have extremely low population 
densities.  Indeed, Uganda has less than half the population per district than Kenya 
does in her districts, despite the fact that Kenya’s districts are secondary to her states, 
putting them at the same administrative level as Uganda’s counties. 
 
                                                 
9 The districts were created in two sets, with fourteen new ones inaugurated in 2005 and another ten in 
2006. 
10 In fact, Uganda has the fourth-highest number of highest-level units of any country in the world, 
after Russia (83), the Philippines (82) and Turkey (81) and just ahead of Thailand (76).  I owe this 
point to John McGarry. 
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Table 2: Sub-National Political Units (Highest Level) in Select African Countries 
(Source: CIA World Factbook, US Census Bureau) 
 
Country Name of Unit Number of Units Population/Unit 
Namibia Regions 13 157,231 
Botswana Districts 9 182,222 
Uganda Districts 80 365,081 
Burundi Provinces 17 475,882 
Malawi Districts 27 492,000 
Zimbabwe Provinces 10 1,223,700 
Zambia Provinces 9 1,254,222 
Tanzania Regions 26 1,440,192 
Sierra Leone Provinces 4 1,501,250 
Sudan States 26 1,586,000 
Rwanda Provinces 5 1,927,600 
Ghana Regions 10 2,247,900 
DR of Congo Provinces 26 2,410,038 
Nigeria States 37 3,563,784 
Kenya Provinces 8 4,486,375 
 Districts 40 897,275 
South Africa Provinces 9 4,909,778 
 
4.2. District Creation and Conflict in Uganda 
 
While a variety of explanations have been given as to the extreme nature of 
district creation in Uganda, perhaps the most plausible is that new districts have been 
a source of electoral patronage for Museveni.  The large number of local jobs that are 
created with the addition of each new district have led voters to respond positively to 
district creation over the years: Table 3 demonstrates that voters in new districts were 
more likely to vote for Museveni than in other districts across the 1996, 2001 and 
2006 presidential elections. 
 
Table 3: Presidential Election Results for New Districts 
(Source: Green (2008)) 
 
Election Type of District Museveni (%) Other Candidates (%) 
1996: New Districts 89.2 10.8 
 Ugandan Average 74.3 25.7 
 
2001: New Districts 72.5 27.5 
 Ugandan Average 69.4 30.6 
 
2006: New Districts 73.6 26.4 
 Ugandan Average 59.3 40.7 
 
MPs have also been very happy to support district creation, as seen in 2005 
when the most recent bout of district creation passed Parliament by a vote of 175 to 
none with one abstention, with hardly any debate about its detrimental aspects.  As 
with voters, MPs have also seen the benefits of the jobs new districts can bring: for 
instance, MP Tiperu Nusura (Women, Yumbe) appreciated the ‘many more Women 
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Members of Parliament and jobs for the unemployed’ (Parliament of Uganda 
Hansard, 20 July, 2005).  Nusura is correct to note the increased presence of Women 
MPs – one of whom is elected from each district – in Parliament, who have increased 
in number by 30 since the ratification of the 1995 constitution.  Thus, of the 309 
voting MPs, 69 are women MPs; while only 14.0% were women MPs in 1996, that 
ratio increased to 24.3% in 2008. 
Along the same lines, another MP, Omara Atube (Otaka, Lira), noted that 
 
Mr Speaker, the purpose of creating new districts is not about bringing 
services nearer to the people, but to contain tribal sentiments and create jobs. 
You are creating districts by dividing a group of people who should be in one 
county and taking them to another county. Somebody will contest for 
leadership from there because he belongs to that ethnic group, this group is a 
minority. These are realities of politics in Uganda (Parliament of Uganda 
Hansard, 20 July, 2005) 
 
Atube is likewise correct to bring up the issue of ethnicity and district creation, as 
those ethnic groups without their ‘own’ district have been in the forefront for 
lobbying for district creation.  This discourse was already noticeable in the mid-
1980s, as the Local Government Commission received numerous requests for the 
creation of ethnically-defined districts.  For instance, members of the self-described 
‘Batagwenda’ ethnic group requested the creation of Ibanda district in western 
Uganda, claiming that their ethnic distinctiveness was reason enough to carve a new 
district out of Bushenyi, Kabarole and Mbarara districts (Government of Uganda 
1987: 127-128). 
 On the one hand, the creation of new districts has never openly been linked to 
ethnicity since Museveni assumed office.  The Commission rejected Ibanda and 
similar attempts at creating ethnically homogenous districts on the basis that such 
groups did not face discrimination within their district, while also noting that it 
rejected the creation of Busia district in eastern Uganda as it ‘has the potential of 
undermining the trend towards Tororo [district] becoming a successful ethnic 
“melting pot”’ (Government of Uganda 1987: 130).  Similarly, Museveni himself has 
explicitly rejected the creation of new districts along ethnic lines, warning local 
politicians against ‘creating division among the people’ (NV 4/8/1997). 
On the other hand, district creation has nonetheless been driven by a de facto, 
if not de jure, balkanization of local politics in Uganda.  This process began with the 
listing of 56 ‘indigenous communities’ in the Third Schedule of the 1995 
Constitution, whose numbers have since been expanded to include nine more such 
communities.  What is striking about the Third Schedule is the way it defines 
indigeneity in Uganda as based on ethnic membership rather than geographic 
residence, a point that has drawn criticism from Mamdani (2001).  Thus, according to 
the constitution, one is not an indigenous member Ugandan unless one’s ethnic group 
is listed in the Third Schedule, thereby creating the pressure for the ever-expanding 
number of ethnic groups listed in the Schedule.  While the Third Schedule has not 
ostensibly been the basis for new district creation, it is clear that, once recognized in 
the constitution, ethnic groups have a greater claim to their own district.  Indeed, it is 
no coincidence that the debate in the Parliament prior to the creation of new districts 
on 20 July, 2005, was about the further addition of nine ethnic groups to this list, 
leading to one MP complaining, ‘let us not start creating tribes like we are going to create 
districts’ (Parliament of Uganda Hansard, 20 July, 2005). 
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Thus, rather than containing ethnic sentiments as suggested by Atube above, 
the balkanization of Uganda into what the East African newspaper called ‘small tribal 
districts’ (EA 8/7/2002) has led to the increased salience of ethnicity in local politics 
as various ethnic groups claim their own districts.  Similarly, despite evidence that a 
majority of new districts do not result in an ethnic group changing from minority to 
majority status in either the new or the ‘mother’ district (Green 2008), it is clear that 
the creation of new districts has reduced what were once ethnically heterogeneous 
districts to ones largely populated by only one or two major ethnic groups, a state of 
affairs identified as potentially dangerous by numerous scholars of civil wars (Collier 
and Hoeffler 1998, De Soysa 2002).  Four examples of how the creation of new 
districts has led to local level ethnic conflict should suffice to demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of this phenomenon. 
The first example is the division of Kabarole district in western Uganda into 
three districts in 2000.  While Kabarole was and is seen as the core territory of the 
Toro Kingdom and thus home to the Batoro ethnic group, it has also been home to 
various indigenous minority communities such as the Bakiga, Banyankole and 
Batagwenda.  Yet by the late 1990s members of these minority communities, all three 
of whom are listed as indigenous in the Constitution, felt confident enough to petition 
Museveni for the creation of two new districts, Kyenjojo and Kamwenge, along ethnic 
lines.  As Batoro would no longer be dominant numerically in these two new districts, 
kingdom supporters were worried that Kyenjojo and Kamwenge would ‘secede’ from 
the kingdom;11 similarly, with control over land now vested in District Land Boards 
(see above), Batoro would no longer be in charge of land allocation in the new 
districts.  As a result noted Ugandan journalist Andrew Mwenda (1999) reported at 
the time that ‘people are even arming themselves for a possible war’ in the region, 
leading to intense talks between various military and security leaders from Kampala 
and local leaders.  In the end President Museveni relented and explicitly went back on 
his previous commitment against the creation of new districts along ethnic lines, 
noting later in a speech that he had supported the new districts as their inhabitants 
were ethnically different from the surrounding Batoro people (NV 24/4/2002). 
A second example comes from the aforementioned Kibaale district, whose 
residents are split between members of the Banyoro and Bakiga ethnic groups and 
who have often clashed in recent years (see section 3.2 above).  During the 2006 
presidential campaign Museveni proposed the removal of the Bakiga-dominated 
Buyaga county from Kibaale and its re-creation as a new district, which would make 
Kibaale once again a Banyoro-dominated district.  Yet, as with the Toro kingdom and 
Kabarole district above, the Bunyoro kingdom government rejected any proposed new 
district in its territory where Banyoro would be dominated by non-Banyoro Ugandans 
and which would therefore most likely secede from the kingdom.  Local Bakiga, of 
course, welcomed the proposed district, thereby exacerbating the already serious rift 
between the two communities that has been erupting off and on since 2002 (Green 
2007). 
                                                 
11 After having been abolished by Milton Obote in 1967, four of Uganda’s kingdoms (Busoga, 
Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro) were restored in 1993, albeit as cultural institutions with no power over 
taxation or administration.  While districts thus do not currently contribute any funds to the upkeep of 
kingdom, Buganda monarchists have led the drive to create regional or federal tiers of government at 
the level of the kingdoms, which would then have both fiscal and political power.  As LRA negotiators 
have also come out recently in support of a regional tier system, its eventual creation continues to look 
more and more likely, thereby creating a large incentive for kingdom governments to prevent districts 
under their nominal aegis from seceding. 
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A third example comes from ethnically Japadhola-dominated Tororo district in 
eastern Uganda, where a number of minority Iteso residents in Tororo county have 
petitioned the government for their own district.  The Commission of Inquiry 
appointed by the central government agreed to create the district but failed to assign 
the current district capital, whose residents are both Japadhola and Iteso, to the new 
district.  The rift led to ethnic divisions in the February 2006 parliamentary race, with 
many local Iteso supporting the Ugandan Asian candidate Sanjay Tana against the 
incumbent MP for Tororo Municipality, Yeri Ofwono.  After winning the election, 
Tana escaped a petrol bomb attack at his residence in April 2006, while in August 
soldiers from the Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF, the Ugandan army) 
forcibly broke up a meeting of Tororo county councillors on the behest of the LCV 
chairman.  In October 2006 the UPDF was again deployed in town after rumours that 
local Iteso extremists were planning on burning down the district headquarters.  
Making explicit the logic of district creation under Museveni, one local councillor 
noted in anger, ‘even areas which did not ask for districts have been given and have 
started operating.  We have been asking for a district since 1998’ (M 6/10/2006). 
A fourth and final example comes from Buliisa, a new district created in July 
2006 on the north-eastern shores of Lake Albert.  Less than a year later violent 
conflict broke out between members of the majority Bagungu ethnic group, 
historically considered a sub-clan of the Banyoro but nonetheless listed as an 
indigenous ethnic group in the Constitution, and Banyarwanda pastoralists, known 
locally as Balaalo (herdsmen).  Accusations that the Balaalo, whom many locals 
accused of being Rwandan immigrants, had allowed their cattle to graze onto 
Bagungu agricultural land and destroy crops led to bloody clashes in June and July 
2007, drawing anti-riot police and attempts by the central government to resettle the 
Balalo elsewhere in Uganda.  While the conflict is multi-faceted and undoubtedly 
related to the recent oil exploration in the Lake Albert region, it is notable that there is 
no record of any Bagungu/Balaalo clashes before the creation of Buliisa district, 
despite evidence that the Balaalo first purchased land in the region in 2003.  
Moreover, one of the local Bagungu most often accused of instigating the conflict is 
the local MP Stephen Birahwa Mukitale, who was elected in 2006 after successfully 
petitioning for the creation of Buliisa district; the new government positions of LCV 
Chairperson and Women MP created along with the district also went to Bagungu 
hardliners unwilling to compromise with the Balaalo.  Thus, as with Tororo and 
elsewhere, the creation of new districts has allowed local extremists to assume power 




 As more generally with Museveni’s rule, which has turned sour for both 
Ugandans and donors in recent years, the initial expectation that the LC system would 
radically transform local politics in Uganda has not been fulfilled.  As Golooba-
Mutebi (1999: 149) writes, ‘much of the applause heaped on the [LC] system in its 
juvenile days was precipitate.  Ten years after the system had been established 
countrywide, it had began to show signs of atrophy and possible terminal decline.’  
Similarly, Mamdani (1996; 1997)’s initial infatuation with the LC system had 
diminished by 2001, when he termed the reforms of the LC system merely ‘partial 
and tentative’ (Mamdani 2001: 171).  Thus, despite measuring favourably against the 
autocratic local government system under Obote and Amin, it is clear that the LC 
system has failed to live up to its preliminary expectations. 
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These diminished expectations have no doubt been in part driven by the way 
decentralization has increased local-level conflict in Uganda in recent years.  The 
concentration of power at the LCV level has led to struggles for power over district 
leadership positions, as exemplified most violently in the case of Kibaale but also in 
Kiboga and Masaka, as well as clashes between local and national governments at the 
district level.  Similarly, Museveni’s ongoing efforts to create new districts have 
intensified, rather than diminished, local ethnic conflicts as the creation of districts 
has altered the majority/minority status of local ethnic groups and thereby intensified 
inter-ethnic competition in such districts as Buliisa, Kabarole, Kibaale and Tororo. 
Of course, to assume that Museveni is solely to blame for ongoing local-level 
conflict in Uganda would be to ignore the difficulties involved in governing an 
underdeveloped state like Uganda.  As with other African states, the power of the 
central government in Uganda does not extend very far or deep outside urban areas, 
which has led Museveni to concentrate local power at the district level and then 
attempt to control that power through central-government appointees.  He has 
similarly attempted to funnel resources to local clients at the local level by creating 
new districts.  Indeed, it is no coincidence that Museveni proposed the creation of new 
districts in July 2005, less than a week before the Parliament voted to overturn 
presidential term limits and allow him to run for a third term. 
In this sense Uganda does not look very different from other underdeveloped 
states like Nigeria and Sudan that have been unable to balance efforts at devolution 
and decentralization of power with conflict prevention and resolution.  One of the 
clear lessons from Uganda is that the decentralization of power to the highest level of 
local government without an accompanying further decentralization of power to lower 
levels of local government is a recipe for conflict.  This is the same problem in 
southern Sudan, where the concentration of power in the Government of Southern 
Sudan has excluded non-Dinka Equatorians and thus led to violent local ethnic 
conflict (Branch and Mampilly 2005).  However, another lesson from ethnically 
heterogeneous states like Uganda is that this very same decentralization of power to 
smaller political units can increase local-level conflict by shifting power from 
ethnically heterogeneous areas to those dominated by only one or two ethnic groups.  
Indeed, the creation of new states and Local Government Areas across Nigeria since 
the 1970s has not only failed to halt ethnic and religious violence but may have even 
contributed to it (Ukiwo 2006).  Uganda’s and Nigeria’s experience here thus echoes 
Treisman (2007: 239)’s worry that decentralization along ethnic lines ‘merely 
relocates the problem [of minority ethnic representation] rather than solves it.’ 
Of course, these two lessons are somewhat contradictory, in that one argues 
for more decentralization while the other cautions against it.  It is for these types of 
contradictions that Treisman (2007) correctly concludes that decentralization in and of 
itself cannot be seen as a necessary tool in conflict prevention and resolution.  The 
Ugandan evidence here thus suggests that a more nuanced understanding of 
decentralization at the national and sub-national level is necessary to understand 
better how and when it may alleviate or exacerbate conflict.  Certainly the next step is 
to examine in more detail similar processes in other such countries in order to 
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